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The Impact of Alternative Negligence Defense Rules 
on Litigation Behavior and Tort Claim Disposition 
Marianne M. Jennings* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
All negligence rules impose an obligation to satisfy a legal stan-
dard of care. Alternative standards can generate very different incen-
tives for taking precautions to avoid consequences of negligent behavior 
and for litigating in the event of an accident. The economic theory of 
tort law seeks to determine what legal rule will achieve efficiency goals 
in terms of the incentives created. In particular, Calabresi has urged 
that the rules of tort liability be structured so as to minimize the sum of 
precaution, accident, and administrative costs. 1 The sweeping changes 
in accident law over the past fifteen years provide a historical backdrop 
for analyzing whether particular legal changes are consistent with effi-
ciency goals. 
One of the more dramatic changes in accident law has been the 
abandonment by most states of the traditional tort defense of contribu-
tory negligence and the adoption of one of three forms of comparative 
negligence. Although empirical evidence on the impact of the policy 
shift is sparse, the changes were made in spite of the concern that com-
parative negligence might result in higher administrative costs and 
greater propensity for claims to be litigated. 2 The changes in the law 
appear to have been based on a belief that comparative negligence is a 
fairer system than negligence with contributory negligence as a defense 
and that the equity advantages outweigh the alleged adverse efficiency 
consequences. 
This article examines new empirical evidence on the impact of al-
ternative negligence rules on costs related to the administration and liti-
gation of accident claims. The new evidence will provide policy makers 
with better information to help them balance the equity /efficiency 
• Full Professor of Business Law, Arizona State University; J.D., Brigham Young Univer-
sity. The author is grateful for the assistance of Professors Janet Smith and Stuart Low in data 
analysis. 
1. For an elaboration of the work of Calabresi and others, see infra note 15. 
2. The importance of resolution costs has been acknowledged in nearly every published dis-
cussion. See, e.g., S. SHAVELL, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 94 (1987). 
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trade-off that underlies the changes in negligence rules. 
Based on an extensive analysis of automobile accident claims aris-
ing across the nation, a state's liability standard does influence claim-
ants' decisions to hire attorneys and pursue litigation. Further, the legal 
standard has a significant impact on the amount of claimant recovery as 
well as the time required to resolve an accident dispute. According to 
the study, plaintiffs are more likely to aggressively pursue claims under 
the comparative negligence standard, and they can generally expect to 
receive higher awards than under the contributory negligence standard. 
The study also provides original evidence on the differential impact of 
the two most popular forms of comparative negligence-the pure and 
modified forms-in terms of the differences in average dollar award, 
time to resolve a claim, and differences in litigation strategy. 
The evidence indicates that litigation costs are significantly higher 
under the modified rule. The findings support the hypothesis that com-
parative negligence raises litigation costs relative to the more traditional 
rule of contributory negligence and suggests that the modified form of 
comparative negligence has higher administrative costs than the pure 
form. In addition, the findings indicate possible interest group motiva-
tions that underlie the adoption of particular standards and suggest 
possible modifications in liability standards to address the efficiency 
concerns. 
Section II of this article provides a historical perspective on the 
dramatic emergence of the comparative negligence liability standard in 
the United States. Section III describes the forms of comparative negli-
gence and provides an analysis of how the alternative liability standards 
affect individual litigation decisions and expected recovery. Based on 
this analysis, empirical implications are generated. Section IV contains 
a description of the data and results of statistical tests. Finally, section 
V provides a summary of the major findings and a discussion of policy 
issues. 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND BIRTH oF CoMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE 
A. Historical Development of Contributory Negligence 
From the time the defense of contributory negligence first ap-
peared in England,3 its wisdom, fairness, and efficiency was questioned. 
3. Butterfield v. Forrester, II East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927 (K.B. 1809). In this case, the 
defendant, in the process of repairing his house, left a pole protruding onto the highway. The 
plaintiff, riding home from a pub at dusk, did not see the pole, ran into it, and was thrown from 
his horse and injured. The issue, from a contributory negligence perspective, was the appropriate 
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The rule created a bar to recovery by plaintiffs who had failed to use 
ordinary care. 
The development of negligence defenses rested on varying legal 
theories• and the defenses have been subject to modification, elimina-
tion, and reinstatement since their inception. 11 Initially, the United 
States chose to follow the strict contributory negligence standard 
wherein any level of plaintiff negligence precluded recovery, but the 
harshness of the results created difficulties for jurors. For practical pur-
poses, plaintiff negligence as a bar to recovery never existed in the ab-
solute sense since jurors seemed to be weighing fault instead of apply-
ing the intended bar to recovery.8 In an effort to avoid the harsh 
level of care to be exercised by the plaintiff while riding his horse. For more background and 
analysis on Butterfield, see generally Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARV. L. REV. 233 
(1908); Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C.L. REv. 3 (1927); 
Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22 GEo. L.J. 674 (1934); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 
51 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1953). 
4. In some instances, the use of the contributory negligence defense was justified as an exten-
sion of proximate cause-a required element of proof in a negligence case. The "proximate cause" 
element is one which requires the plaintiff to show that his negligence is not an intervening cause 
between the defendant's negligence and his resulting injury. See, e.g., Ware v. Saufley, 194 Ky. 
53, 237 S.W. 1060 (1922); Gilman v. Central Vt. Ry., 93 Vt. 340, 107 A. 122 (1919); Exum v. 
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 154 N.C. 408, 70 S.E. 845, (191 1); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Wills, 111 
Va. 32, 68 S.E. 395, (1910). However, the analysis of proximate cause is a "but for" analysis 
which asks: "but for the negligence of the defendant, would the plaintiff still have been injured?" 
In most cases of contributory negligence, the plaintiff would still have been injured but, perhaps, 
less so. 
In other cases, the defense developed around a penalty theory. Barring negligent plaintiffs' 
recovery was justified by reasoning it would encourage them to use more caution. Whether this 
penalty theory has been an effective deterrent for negligent defendants remains an unanswered 
empirical question. Defendants, of course, have always been subject to such a penalty. See, e.g., 
Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 Ohio St. 470, 15 N.E. 350, (1887). 
Other courts simply recognized that the realities of industrial development required some 
liability limitations and protection. The doctrine of contributory negligence precluded recovery 
even though the jury may have been moved to give something to the plaintiff if the jury found the 
plaintiff negligent. For a more complete discussion of this industrial protectionism rationale, see 
Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REv. 151 (1946), and Ma-
lone, Comparative Negligence-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 LA. L. REV. 125 (1945); see 
also Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI. KENT L. REv. 189, 201 (1950) (The 
swift and universal acceptance of contributory negligence was attributed to the industry's need for 
protection "against the ravages which might have been wrought by over-sympathetic juries."); H. 
WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT 9 (2d ed. 1978) (The judiciary recog-
nized that the "jury sympathy factor" could wreak financial disaster upon burgeoning industry 
without the check of contributory negligence since juries admit they view industry as "harmful 
entities with deep pockets.") 
5. For a more complete discussion of historical origins and modification of negligence de-
fenses see Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation 
Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 775 (1982). 
6. Scholars have made the point that juries may have largely ignored the true impact of a 
finding of contributory negligence and applied their own theories of comparative negligence with-
out ever stating their processes for arriving at a decision. See ULMAN, A JuDGE TAKES THE 
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contributory negligence results, the judiciary initiated the last clear 
chance doctrine7 to give the plaintiff an opportunity to recover, even if 
the plaintiff was negligent, if the defendant could have eliminated the 
danger to plaintiff and failed to do so.8 Therefore, the defendant was 
the last one to be negligent. The ultimate effect of "last clear chance" 
may have been to cloud the issues surrounding responsibility, causing 
courts to become entangled in discussions of when the doctrine applied 
and, if so, how it effected recovery.9 
STAND 30-34 (1933); see also Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 281 N.W. 261, 
(1938). 
7. The doctrine originated in 1842 in Davies v. Mann, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842) and was 
readily accepted in the United States. See, e.g., Fuller v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 100 Miss. 705, 56 So. 
783 ( 1911 ). The Davies case involved a fettered donkey left in the road by the plaintiff, which was 
then run over by the defendant, who, if he had been driving reasonably, had the last clear chance 
to avoid the accident. 
8. The "last clear chance" doctrine has been referred to as a "transitional doctrine" or "a 
way station on the road to apportionment of damages." See James, Last Clear Chance: A Transi-
tional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938). The impact of this doctrine may also have been to 
prevent directed verdicts upon proof of contributory negligence and, hence, to allow juries the right 
to deliberate negligence levels. 
9. The results of the debate were confusing. They provided a great deal of circumstantial 
evidence and no clear statement of how the doctrine really worked or when it was to be applied. 
For example, the following applications of the rule regarding "sighting of danger" developed: 
a. It was a defense to contributory negligence only in cases where the plaintiff was 
helpless and the defendant actually discovered the helpless plaintiff. See Storr v. New York 
Cent. R.R., 261 N.Y. 348, 185 N.E. 407 (1933); Cleveland Ry. v. Masterson, 126 Ohio St. 
42, 183 N.E. 873 (1932). 
b. It was a defense to contributory negligence if the defendant would have discovered the 
helpless plaintiff had the defendant been using reasonable care. See Independent Lumber Co. 
v. Leatherwood, 102 Colo. 460, 79 P.2d 1052 (1938); Leinbach v. Pickwick-Greyhound 
Lines, 138 Kan. 50, 23 P.2d 449 (1933); St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Watts, 110 Tex. 106, 216 
S.W. 391 (1919); Nicol v. Oregon-Wash. R.R. & Navigation Co., 71 Wash. 409, 128 P. 628 
(1912); Teakle v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R.R., 32 Utah 276, 90 P. 402 (1907); Pickett v. 
Wilmington & W.R.R., 117 N.C. 616, 23 S.E. 264 (1895). 
c. It was a defense to contributory negligence in cases where the plaintiff was not help-
less but was negligent and the defendant discovered the negligence and the danger or peril but 
did nothing. See Groves v. Webster City, 222 Iowa 849, 270 N.W. 329 (1936); Yazoo & 
M.V.R.R. Co. v. Lee, 148 Miss. 809, 114 So. 866 (1927); Darling v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 197 
Cal. 702, 242 P. 703 (1925); Tyrrell v. Boston & M.R.R., 77 N.H. 320, 91 A. 179 (1914); 
Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. v. Croly, 54 Ind. App. 96 N.E. 973 (1913). 
d. It was a defense to contributory negligence in those cases where some negligence or 
lack of reasonable care on the part of the defendant prevented the defendant from stopping 
the chain of events he/she otherwise would have been able to stop (the "bad brakes" defense). 
See Dent v. Bellows Falls & S.R. St. Ry., 95 Vt. 523, 116 A. 83 (1922); Little Rock Traction 
& Elec. Co. v. Morrison, 69 Ark. 289, 62 S.W. 1045 (1901); Lloyd v. Albemarle & R.R., 
118 N.C. 1010, 24 S.E. 805 (1896). 
Prosser, has provided a more complete summary of the confusion of the doctrine's application. 
W. KEETON, D. DoBBS, R. KEETON & D. OwEN, PRoSSER & KEETON oN ToRTS,§ 67, at 472-
74 (5th ed. 1984). It is interesting to note that from the case titles alone, it is clear that the 
doctrine seems to have been created for the protection of railroads since nearly 90o/o of the cases 
applying the doctrine of last clear chance involved railroads. 
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The need for change became evident because of the lack of uni-
formity in the application of the negligence defense and the confusion 
surrounding the attempt at correction through the use of "last clear 
chance".10 Perhaps the greatest contribution of the early defenses and 
their inconsistent application was the establishment of a need for a neg-
ligence system that examines not only the parties' actions but also pro-
vides a clearer method for allocating responsibility. 11 The subsequent 
changes that were made in interpretation and application of negligence 
defenses were absorbed and institutionalized over nearly a 100-year pe-
riod. The changes were judicial and developed slowly, as the nature of 
negligence cases and the impact on recovery levels were reviewed. 
As noted in the following sections, the shift to the comparative 
negligence defenses was more sudden, done largely through legislative 
action. 12 The shift in defense theories appears to have been made 
10. Prosser labeled the process "haphazard" and noted: 
There are still juries which understand and respect the court's instructions on contribu-
tory negligence, just as there are other juries which throw them out of the window and 
refuse even to reduce the recovery by so much as a dime. Above all there are many 
directed verdict cases where the plaintiffs negligence, however slight it may be in com-
parison with that of the defendant, is still clear beyond dispute, and the court has no 
choice but to declare it as a matter of law. 
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 9, at 469. 
11. Some attempts were made to eliminate, at least, directed verdicts in negligence cases in 
which contributory negligence was raised as a defense. For example, Arizona adopted a constitu-
tional provision that required all issues of contributory negligence to be decided by a jury. ARIZ. 
CoNST. art XVIII, § 5, provides: "The defense of contributory negligence or assumption of risk 
shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact and shall, at all times, be left to the jury." 
While the directed verdict problem was eliminated, the problem of jury inconsistency in the appli-
cation of this defense to liability was exacerbated. Some states have always required that the issues 
of negligence (including defenses) be submitted to a jury. Presently, Arizona is a comparative 
negligence state (modified from the contributory standard in 1984), see ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 
12-2505 (1984) and infra notes 36, 37, and 39-42; but the plaintiff's negligence still remains a 
jury question. 
12. The vacillation may best be explained by historical and political factors. During the U.S. 
era of industrial growth and geographic and economic expansion, it was deemed important that 
railroads and other critical businesses enjoy some nurturing in the form of freedom from liability 
in all but the cases in which they were completely at fault. The strength (political and otherwise) 
of certain lobbies and interests has had great influence in the movement to comparative negligence 
defenses. See, e.g., Fleming, Comparative Negligence At Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CAL. L. 
REv. 239 (1976); Krause, Nofault's Alternative-The Case for Comparative Negligence and 
Compulsory Arbitration, 44 N.Y. ST. B.J. 535 (1972). The Defense Research Institute's (DRI) 
report took the following position: "The determination of whether or not the rule of contributory 
negligence should be abandoned is a matter for local determination, but that the Wisconsin com-
parative negligence rule and procedures should be adopted if the contributory negligence is to be 
discarded." RESPONSIBLE REFORM-A PROGRAM TO IMPROVE THE LIABILITY REPARATIONS 
SYSTEM 23 (1969). 
For an alternative explanation of the motivation for the shift toward comparative negligence, 
see R. Curran, The Spread of the Comparative Negligence Rule Through the United States 
(1989) (article on file with the BYU Journal of Public Law). Curran argues that adoption of 
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largely on the vague concept of fairness: that comparative negligence is 
more fair than contributory negligence.13 Those urging the shift have 
based their argument largely on the notion that a little bit of fault 
should not excuse a large amount of fault. 14 While the efficiency impli-
cations of the comparative negligence shift have been considered in the 
law and economics literature, 10 the means of analysis have been theo-
retical and have focused on differences in incentives to take precaution 
that are created by the various forms of negligence defenses. 16 In con-
product liability rules affect the spread of comparative negligence. "By radically changing the 
interests of manufacturers, the adoption of products liability law enabled the lawyers to success-
fully push for the adoption of a tort law which clearly benefits their interests." /d. at 24. 
13. See, e.g., Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 5 (1953). Prosser com-
ments on the inherent unfairness of the contributory negligence defenses and notes: "Although the 
courts almost from the beginning have displayed an uneasy consciousness that something is wrong, 
they have been slow to move." /d.; see also R. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE 49-53 
(1969); Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L. J. 697 
(1978); Burrows & Velijanovski, The Economic Theory of Tort Liability: Toward a Corrective 
justice Approach, in EcoNOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 125, 142 (P. Burrows & C. Velijanovski 
eds. 1981) [hereinafter Velijanovski ]. 
14. Prosser uses the following example: 
Above all there are many directed verdict cases where the plaintiffs negligence, how-
ever slight it may be in comparison with that of the defendant, is still clear beyond 
dispute, and the court has no choice but to declare it as a matter of law. A striking 
illustration is the Minnesota case in which a motorist entering an intersection failed to 
yield the right of way on the mistaken assumption that the speeding defendant would 
slow down for him, and the supreme court uttered an almost pathetic appeal to a legis-
lature, which still remains indifferent, to relieve it of the necessity of such decisions by 
adopting a "comparative negligence" act. 
PROSSER & KEETON ON ToRTS, supra note 9, at 470 (citing Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 
202 Minn. 425, 281 N.W. 261 (1938)). In Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W. Va. 332, 
256 S.E.2d 879, 882 (1979), the court noted: "There is an almost universal dissatisfaction among 
leading scholars of tort law with the harshness of the doctrine of contributory negligence. Neither 
intensive scholarship nor complex legal arguments need be advanced to demonstrate its strictness." 
15. The earliest date on a scholarly economic analysis of the defenses is 1970 (G. CALA-
BRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970)); followed by 
Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 346-47 (1973); and 
Posner's work including, Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REv. 757 (1975) 
and his treatise on law and economics first published in 1972 (R. PosNER, EcoMONIC ANALYSIS 
OF LAw (2d ed. 1977). Most other literature appeared in the late 1970s and 1980s. See, e.g., 
Schwartz, supra note 13; Haddock & Curran, An Economic Theory of Comparative Negligence, 
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1985); Rea, The Economics of Comparative Negligence, 7 INT'L REv. OF 
L. AND EcoN 149 (1978); Velijanovski, supra note 13; Cooter & Ulen, An Economic Case for 
Comparative Negligence, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1067 (1986); W. LANDES & R. PoSNER, THE Eco-
NOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987). 
16. For example, Judge Learned Hand, in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 
169 (2d Cir. 1947), established what has become known as the "Hand formula" when he ana-
lyzed whether barge owners should be required to keep an employee on board when the barges 
were moored because the barges could break loose and damage other ships. Hand looked at three 
factors in determining the duty of barge owners: 
(1) the extent of the injury if a barge breaks away (L); 
(2) the burden of taking the precautions needed to prevent loose barges (B); and 
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trast, the impact of the comparative negligence on litigation behavior 
has not been considered in any systematic way. 
B. The Birth of Comparative Negligence 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, the English courts, in ad-
miralty cases, developed the first simple method of comparing the negli-
gence levels of the plaintiffs and assessing damages accordingly .17 The 
U.S. courts and lawmakers were somewhat slower in recognizing the 
method of comparing conduct and appeared to vacillate between adopt-
ing comparative negligence and retreating to contributory negligence. 18 
For example, in a very early case, Galena & Chicago Union R.R. v. 
Jacobs/ 9 the Illinois Supreme Court judicially rejected contributory 
negligence and adopted a form of comparative negligence,20 but later 
appeared to reverse itself.21 In early cases, the courts, in an attempt to 
(3) the probability the barge will break away, 
A barge owner is negligent if the burden of precautions was less than the injury times 
probability or if B < PL because it is more efficient to have the barge owner keep the barge tied 
than to pay for the consequences of or damages from a loose barge. !d. at 173. 
17. Around 1700 (in a non-jury system), the English admiralty courts divided damages 
equally when all the parties were negligent. Though equal division may seem primitive, it did 
result in a distribution of damages among the parties as opposed to the complete bar to recovery 
result under contributory negligence. See R. MARSDEN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COLLI-
SIONS AT SEA 195 (8th ed. 1923). 
18. Today, the U.S. is the only major country allowing contributory negligence. There are 
still a few states with the defense. Although it originated in England, the contributory negligence 
standard is no longer followed in the British Empire. See Law Reform Act of 1945, 8 (U.K.); 
N.Z. Stat. Repr. No. 3, 756 (1947); see also Shatwell, Contributory Negligence and Apportion-
ment Statutes, I W. AusT. ANN. L. REV. 145 (1949); Williams, The Law Reform (Contributory 
Negligence) Act, 1945, 9 Moo. L. REv. 105 (1945). 
19. 20 Jll. 478 (1858). 
20. The court reached the conclusion that liability of the defendant is not dependent upon the 
complete absence of plaintiffs negligence: 
[A]ll care or negligence is at best but relative, the absence of the highest possible degree 
of care showing the presence of some negligence, slight as it may be. The true doctrine, 
therefore, we think is, that in proportion to the negligence of the defendant, should be 
measured [against] the degree of care required of the plaintiff-that is to say, the more 
gross the negligence manifested by the defendant, the less degree of care will be re-
quired of the plaintiff to enable him to recover. 
/d. at 496. 
21. For example, in Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Baches, 55 Ill. 379 (1870), the court refined the 
Galena holding in reviewing an incorrect instruction given to the jury: 
Under this instruction, the jury were required to find for the plaintiff, although de-
ceased might have been guilty of negligence equal to that of appellants. Such has never 
been recognized as the rule of law in this class of cases. This instruction should have 
been refused, or modified so as to announce the rule of comparative negligence before it 
was given. 
!d. at 389-90. 
In a later case, Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Hammer, 72 Ill. 347 (1874) the court noted generically 
the difficulties with the doctrine: 
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define comparative fault, allowed negligent plaintiffs to recover only if 
their negligence was slight and defendant's was gross.22 Also, in the 
early decisions, plaintiffs were permitted to recover if the defendant's 
actions were "willful," "wanton," or "reckless,"23 or if there was a 
statutory violation by the defendant when the statute was enacted to 
protect plaintiffs.24 As noted earlier, the doctrine of last clear chance 
was, in part, a movement to the comparative standard;211 some states 
refused to recognize the doctrine,26 while others recognized it under an-
other name.27 Although widely discussed, the doctrine of last clear 
chance did not enjoy the universal appeal necessary for a modification 
of the contributory negligence defense. 
The passage of the Federal Employers Liability Act28 in 1908 es-
tablished the necessary precedent for statutory comparative negligence 
and served as a model for state legislators to make the defense a perma-
nent part of negligence liability determinations. 29 The Act was applica-
ble to all negligence cases for injuries sustained by railroad employees 
engaged in interstate commerce and provided that the contributory neg-
ligence of the employee would not act as a bar to recovery, but the 
The rule on this subject, it may be, has not at all times been accurately stated by 
this court. By inadvertence, it has been loosely and indefinitely stated in some of the 
cases, but what the court has held, and still holds, is, that a plaintiff free from all 
negligence may recover from a defendant who has failed to use such care as ordinarily 
prudent men generally employ; or, a plaintiff who is even guilty of slight negligence 
may recover from a defendant who has been grossly negligent, or whose conduct has 
been wanton or willful. Hence the doctrine of comparative negligence. 
/d. at 351. 
22. "[P]laintiff's action can not be defeated by his own negligence, unless such negligence be 
at least equal to that of defendant." Indianapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Evans, 88 Ill. 63, 65 (1878). 
23. See Prosser, supra note 13, at 5; see also Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 
332, 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979); Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585, 256 N.W.2d 400 (1977). 
24. See Prosser, supra note 13, at 5-6. 
25. See supra notes 3, 17, and 20. Again, in the interest of fairness, the only true consistency 
in the application of the doctrine appears to be its use in cases where the application of contribu-
tory negligence as a bar to recovery would be a true hardship for the plaintiff. Prosser, supra note 
13, at 8. 
26. Illinois courts have expressly found the doctrine of "last clear chance" not to be the law 
of the state. Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981). 
27. See Walldren Express & Van Co. v. Krug, 291 Ill. 472, 126 N.E. 97, 98 (1920) (The 
phrase "conscious indifference to consequences," was employed to hold a defendant liable in a case 
in which the plaintiff was negligent.); Prosser, supra note 13, at 8. 
28. Federal Employers Liability Act of 1908, ch. 149, § 1, 35 Stat. 65 (codified as amended 
at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1981)). 
29. The federal statute opened the door for state application of the principle to generic acci-
dent cases. Prior to the time of the federal statute, some comparative negligence theory had been 
applied in industrial accident cases. E.g., Galena & C. Union R.R. v . .Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478, 496; see 
also Act of Jan. 1, 1863, GA. ConE § 2979 (1863) (codified at GA. CoDE ANN. § 46-8-291 
(1986)). However, after workers' compensation systems developed, both negligence and compara-
tive negligence as issues in industrial accident cases became irrelevant. 
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employee's recovery would be reduced proportionately according to the 
amount of his negligence. Shortly thereafter, Congress incorporated the 
doctrine of comparative negligence into several other areas of federal 
law.30 
Within as little as five years, a trend emerged in which states fol-
lowed the federal examples and enacted legislation adopting the doc-
trine of comparative negligence in industrial accident cases.31 Missis-
sippi's 1910 statute was the first comparative negligence standard 
which was applicable to all negligence cases.82 However, between the 
enactment of the 1910 Mississippi statute and 1950, only four addi-
tional states adopted statutory comparative negligence standards. 88 
During this time, several states did adopt the standard for cases involv-
ing hazardous activities,34 and other states made the Federal Employee 
Liability Act applicable to employees engaged in interstate commerce. Sl! 
The comparative negligence defense remained a controversial and de-
bated, albeit defeated, issue in state legislatures for forty years. 86 After 
30. The standard was adopted for cases arising under the Jones Act (Maritime Cases), Act 
of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, sec. 33, 41 Stat. 1007 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 
(1987)), and under the Death on the High Seas Act, Act of Mar. 30, 1920, Ch. 111, sec. 6, 41 
Stat. 537 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 766 (1987)). 
31. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 11-8-104 (Supp. 1987) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 13, 
1913, ch. 175, § 2, 1913 Ark. Acts); Cow. REv. STAT.§ 40-33-102 (1984) (originally enacted as 
Act of Feb. 25, 1939, ch. 139, § 2, 1937 Colo. Sess. Laws 512-13); and VA. ConE ANN.§ 8.01-58 
(1950) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 21, 1916, ch. 444, § 2, 1916 Va. Acts 762-63). The acts, 
respectively, covered employees of intrastate corporations and railroad employees. 
32. Act of Apr. 16, 1910, ch. 135, 1910 Miss. Laws 125 (codified at Miss. ConE ANN.§ 11-
7-15 (1986)). As originally passed, the standard was adopted for all personal injury accidents but 
was later made applicable to property damages cases. See Act. of Mar. 25, 1920, ch. 312, 1920 
Miss. Laws 441 (codified at Miss. ConE ANN. § 11-7-15 (Supp. 1988)). 
33. E.g., Nebraska (Act of Apr. 16, 1913, ch. 124, § 1,1913 Neb. Laws 311-12 (codified at 
NEB. REv. STAT.§ 25-21, 185 (1985)); South Dakota (Act of Mar. 13, 1941, ch. 160, §I, 1941 
S.D. Laws 184 (codified at S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (Rev. 1987)). Georgia's adoption 
was somewhat less generic but was certainly an adoption in spirit: "If the plaintiff by ordinary 
care could have avoided the consequences to himself caused by the defendant's negligence, he is not 
entitled to recover. In other cases the defendant is not relieved, although the plaintiff may in some 
way have contributed to the injury sustained." Act of Jan. I, 1863, GA. ConE § 2914 (1863) 
(codified at GA. CODE ANN.§ 51-11-7 (1987)). Cases following the Georgia statute (which was 
limited to railroad accidents) expanded the application of the comparative negligence standard, 
which remains as the Georgia standard today. For application to industrial accidents, see, e.g., 
Smith v. American Oil Co., 77 Ga. App. 463, 49 S.E.2d 90 (1948); Elk Cotton Mills v. Grant, 
140 Ga. 727, 79 S.E. 836 (1913). 
34. For hazardous activities, including mining, see, e.g., United Verde Extension Mining Co. 
v. Koso, 273 F. 369 (D.C. Cir. 1921); see also Ft.A. STAT.§ 769.03 (1941); IowA ConE ANN.§§ 
479-124, 429-125 (West 1949). 
35. Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, North Da-
kota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming. See PROSSER & KEETON ON 
ToRTS, supra note 9, at 479. 
36. During the two decades between 1940 and 1960, 21 state legislatures debated but re-
jected the standard of comparative negligence. See V. ScHWARTZ, CoMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 
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1970 and the introduction of no-fault laws, the standard of comparative 
negligence gained ground both legislatively and judicially.37 By 1986, 
1.4 (B), at 12-13 (2d ed. 1986). The reason for the lack of motivation to change may have been 
the strength of the insurance industry lobby. However, when no-fault legislation gained momen-
tum, those opposing no-fault plans began to propose elimination of contributory negligence as a 
means for retaining some part of the common law. For additional background on the insurance 
lobby, see supra note 12. The following comparative negligence states also have no-fault 
provisions: 
Arkansas 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Kansas 
Massachusetts 
Minnesota 
Montana 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New York 
North Dakota 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Rhode Island 
South Dakota 
Texas 
Utah 
Vermont 
Washington 
Wyoming 
(ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-89-202 to -204 (1987). 
(Cow. REv. STAT.§ 13-21-111 (1987)). 
(CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572 (West Supp. 1989)). 
(FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.730-741 (West Supp. 1984)). 
(GA. CoDE ANN. tit. 56-34015 to -34136 (Supp. 1987)). 
(HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1985), § 431:10C-102(A) (1987)). 
(IDAHO CoDE § 6-801 (Supp. 1989)). 
(KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258(a) (Supp. 1988)). 
(MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West 1985)). 
(MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1988)). 
(MONT. CODE ANN.§ 27-1-702 (1987)). 
(NEV. REV. STAT.§ 41.141 (1987)). 
(N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507(d) to (i) (Supp. 1988)). 
(N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 to -5.3 (West Supp. 1987)). 
(N.Y. C1v. PRAC. L. & R. § 1411 (McKinney 1976)). 
(N.D. CENT. CoDE § 9-10-07 (1987)). 
(OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 13, 14 (West 1987)). 
(OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1987)). 
(R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (1985)). 
(S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 58-23-6 to -8 (1978)). 
(TEX. C1v. PRAC. & REM. CoDE § 33-001 (Vernon Supp. 1989)). 
(UTAH CoDE ANN. § 78-27-38 (1987)). 
(VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp. 1979)). 
(WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005 (1987)). 
(WYO. STAT.§ 1-1-109 (Supp. 1988)). 
For a more complete discussion of legislative history, see Krause, supra note 12. 
37. The following table from W. LANDES & R. PosNER, supra note 15, at 83, shows the 
movement to comparative negligence. The notes have been inserted for explanatory purposes. 
STATE 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
District of Columbia 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
DECISION 
1975 
1975 
1973 
STATUTE 
1984 
1955 
1973 
1973 
1984 
1984 
18553 
1969 
1971 
1984 
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all but nine states had adopted the standard, primarily through legisla-
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky' 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Missouri• 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Utah 
Vermont 
Virginii 
Washington 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
1979 
1981 
1982 
1984 
1974 
1979 
1965 
1969 
1969 
1919d 
1975 
1913 
1973 
1969 
1973 
1975 
1973 
1980 
1973 
1971 
1976 
1971 
1941 
1973 
1973 
1970 
1973 
1931 
1973 
•The Georgia statute enacted in 1855 (1863) was applicable to railroad accidents only but was 
applied generically in spite of the statutory restriction. 
bAs noted in supra note 21, Illinois judicially adopted the doctrine in 1863. 
'In Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Ky. 1984), the Kentucky Supreme Court declined to 
wait for legislative action and adopted the jury instructions from the Uniform Comparative Fault 
Act: "Henceforth, where contributory negligence has previously been a complete defense, it was 
supplanted by the doctrine of comparative negligence .... " /d. 
dAs noted in supra note 32, the date of the original statute was 1910 and was made applicable to 
property in 1920. 
•In Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983), the Missouri Supreme Court also adopted 
the Uniform Comparative Fault Act: "Insofar as possible this and future cases shall apply the 
doctrine of pure comparative fault in accordance with the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. ... " 
/d. at 15. 
fin Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Winesett, 225 Va. 459, 303 S.E.2d 868, 876 (1983) (Compton, 
J., dissenting), the court found that the decedent, "an adult of average intelligence who was 
perched on a metal ladder ... [who] undertook to cut with an electric saw a limb overhanging 
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tive action.38 The cautious resistance to a different standard during the 
period from 1910 through 1970 was largely the result of dealing with 
the unknown impact of these new defense standards on the amount of 
litigation, the size of verdicts, and whether the existence of the defense 
had optimal deterrent effects. Interestingly, once the movement took 
hold, it progressed rapidly and continued in spite of limited analysis of 
any quantitative impact. 
III. CuRRENT FoRMS oF CoMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THEIR IMPACT ON EXPECTED RECOVERY AND 
LITIGATION DECISIONS 
Currently, there are four forms of comparative negligence stan-
dards in use. These are the pure form, under which each party may 
recover from the other based on respective degrees of negligence; two 
versions of modified comparative negligence, referred to as the fifty-
percent rule and the fifty-percent plus rule; and finally, the slight-gross 
rule, under which a plaintiff's contributory negligence bars recovery, 
unless his negligence is "slight" and the defendant's is "gross." The 
two modified rules are identical in effect when the parties' degrees of 
negligence are different, such as when the plaintiff is twenty-five per-
cent at fault and the defendant is seventy-five percent at fault, but can 
yield different outcomes when negligence levels are equal. 
To illustrate the basic differences between the pure and modified 
rules in terms of expected net recovery, consider the following hypo-
thetical example. Parties A and B have an accident in which A's car is 
destroyed ($15,000) and B's truck is destroyed ($35,000). A sues B for 
negligence, and B counterclaims on the basis of A's negligence. Sup-
pose, initially that a jury determines that A is twenty-five percent at 
fault and B is seventy-five percent at fault. For the purpose of illustra-
tion, attorney fees and any other costs associated with the litigation are 
not considered. 
Under pure comparative negligence, damages are apportioned ac-
cording to the parties' respective levels of negligence. Thus, A would 
recover seventy-five percent of the $15,000 loss (the percent to which B 
is at fault for damages to A's vehicle) but would be liable for twenty-
five percent of B's loss. The expected net return to A is $2,500, deter-
[an] exposed wire," was not contributorily negligent. By holding there was no contributory negli-
gence in this case, the majority decision indicates some tendency to avoid the harshness of a con-
tributory negligence rule. 
38. However, three of the nine states have judicial decisions which have adopted the standard 
of comparative negligence. See supra note 37, at subnotes c, e, and f, for reference to the decisions. 
The states remain unchanged from the chart above, supra note 37, with the exceptions noted. 
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mined as follows: 
$11,250 
- 8,750 
$ 2,500 
Amount owed A by B (75% of $15,000) 
Amount owed B by A (25% of $35,000) 
Expected net recovery to A 
45 
Figure 1 illustrates how the expected net recovery for A changes 
under the pure form of comparative negligence as relative negligence 
levels vary. At zero percent negligence, A expects to recover her full 
loss ($15,000) as indicated by point "a" on the graph. In this example, 
the point at which she expects to net zero dollars is at a thirty-percent 
negligence level. Beyond that negligence level, she expects to owe B 
more than B owes her. At point "c", both parties are equally at fault 
and A expects to owe B $10,000, which is determined as A's share of 
B's loss (50% of $35,000) less B's share of A's loss (50% of $15,000). 
The entire schedule of net recovery amounts for Party A under pure 
comparative negligence is represented by the straight line "a-c-e." 
Figure 1 
Expected Net Recovery Levels As A Function of Plaintiff Negligence 
Under Modified and Pure Comparative Negligence' 
Expe<ted 
Net 
Recovery 
For 
Plaintiff 
(1000) 
20 a 
10 
7.5 
·10 
·17.5 
·20 
.JO 
·40 
ace = expected net 
recovery under 
pure form 
ab/de = expected net recovery 
under modified 
forms 
Percent 
Plaintiff Negligence 
1 The expected net recovery amounts are calculated as Party A's recovery net of any payment due 
Party B. The calculations assume no attorneys' fees and are based on assumed facts presented in 
text. 
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A majority of states have adopted one of two modified forms of 
comparative negligence.39 The fifty-percent rule retains contributory 
negligence as a bar to recovery when the plaintiffs negligence is equal 
to or greater than the defendant's.40 When the parties meet half-way on 
fault, each bears his or her own loss and neither recovers. Under the 
fifty percent plus rule, a party who is more at fault than the other is 
precluded from recovery.41 The two rules vary only in how damages 
are calculated in cases of equal fault. 
The above example illustrates that a party who is less than fifty 
percent at- fault will always expect to do better in terms of net recovery 
under a modified comparative negligence rule than under the pure 
form. This is because, as under contributory negligence, a party more 
than fifty percent at fault is barred from recovery under modified com-
parative negligence so there can be no effective counterclaim. In con-
trast, such a defendant is not so barred under the pure form, thus facil-
itating an effective counterclaim and possible recovery. 
Given the example, under the modified rules, A expects to be com-
pensated for seventy-five percent of her losses, or $11,250, with no off-
setting recovery to B. Referring to Figure 1, at twenty-five percent neg-
ligence, the vertical distance between expected net recovery under the 
39. According to Cooter and Ulen, supra note 15, at 1077, the pure form has been adopted 
in 7 of the 44 states that have adopted some form of comparative negligence. These include: Ari-
zona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 12-2503 to -2509 (Supp. 1986)); Iowa (IowA ConE ANN. § 668 
(West Supp. 1986)); Louisiana (LA. Civ. ConE ANN. art. 2323 (West Supp. 1987)); Mississippi 
(Miss. ConE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972)); New York (N.Y. Civ. PRov. L. R. § 1411 (McKinny 
1976)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 9-20-4 (1985)); and Washington (WASH. PREV. ConE 
ANN.§ 4.22.005 (Supp. 1987)). Cooter and Ulen also interpret application of the rules differently, 
supra note 15, at 1075-78. 
40. The 50% rule has been adopted in the following states: Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 
27-1763 to -1765 (1979)); Colorado (Cow. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (Supp. 1986)); Idaho 
(IDAHO CODE§§ 6-801 to -806 (1979)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1984)); Maine 
(ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1980)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. ConE § 9-10-07 
(1975)); and Utah (UTAH ConE ANN. § 78-27-38 (Supp. 1986)). 
41. Under this form, the contributory negligence rule takes effect as in the 50% rule but does 
so at 50.001 'l'o as opposed to the even split. Again, many fail to see the rationale for drawing the 
line at different percentages. The 50% plus rule has been adopted in these states: Connecticut 
(CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 52-572(h) (West 1989)); Delaware (DEL CoDE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 
(Supp. 1988)); Hawaii (HAW. REv. STAT. § 663-31 (1985)); Indiana (IND. ConE ANN. § 34-4-
33-4 (Burns (1986)); Massachusetts (MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West 1985)); Min-
nesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1988)): Montana (MoNT. ConE ANN. § 27-1-
702 (1987)); Nevada (NEv. REv. STAT. § 41-141 (1987)); New Hampshire (N.H. REv. STAT. 
ANN.§ 507:7(d) (Supp. 1988)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:15-5.1 (West Supp. 1989)); 
Ohio (OHIO REV. ConE ANN. § 2315.19 (Anderson 1988)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
23, § 13 (West 1987)); Oregon (OR. REv. STAT. § 18.470 (1987)); Pennsylvania (PA. CoNs. 
STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon Supp. 1989)); Texas (TEX. CIV. PROC. & REM. CoDE ANN. § 
33.001 (Vernon Supp. 1989)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1985); Wisconsin (Wis. 
STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983); and Wyoming (Wvo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (Supp. 1988)). 
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modified versions of comparative negligence ($11,250) and under pure 
comparative negligence ($2,500) equals $8,750. Since, in this situation 
B does not recover anything under modified comparative negligence, 
A's recovery is higher by $8,750 under the modified rules. 
The schedule of recovery amounts, under modified comparative 
negligence, as A's negligence level varies is denoted by line segment "a-
b-d-e". The discontinuity in the graph arises because cases of equal 
fault are treated differently. Under the fifty percent rule, contributory 
negligence is equal to or greater than the defendant's; hence, A expects 
to recover zero dollars from B because each party bears his or her own 
loss. Under the fifty percent plus rule, a party is precluded from recov-
ery only if the party is more at fault than the other. Hence, at the fifty-
fifty point, both parties can recover, and in the example, this amount is 
denoted at point "c" -the same amount as under pure comparative 
negligence. Beyond the fifty-fifty level, the points plotted on line seg-
ment "d-e" represent expected net recovery amounts for A under the 
two modified versions as plaintiff negligence increases to 100 percent. 
A final version of comparative negligence is the slight-gross rule, 
currently in effect in only two states.42 The effect of this rule is difficult 
to quantify graphically, since the meanings of "slight" and "gross" are 
not defined in terms of percentage fault. The rule retains the recovery 
bar of contributory negligence, unless the plaintiff can show that her 
negligence was slight and the defendant's was gross. Ostensibly, the 
level of plaintiffs negligence that bars recovery need not be much 
greater than slight and therefore allows the plaintiff only a small mar-
gin of error before risking a complete bar to recovery. Because this rule 
is of little practical importance, the empirical analysis of the negligence 
rules is limited to forms other than the slight-gross rule. However, 
sample statistics for this rule are offered in Table II. 
In summary, the above example provides testable implications con-
cerning negligence rules. First, it is possible to rank the rules of con-
tributory negligence, as well as the modified and pure forms of compar-
ative negligence, according to expected net recovery for a plaintiff who 
42. The slight-gross rule is used in only Nebraska (NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21, 185 (1985)) 
and South Dakota (S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 20-9-2 (1987)). The South Dakota version only 
requires the plaintiff to establish that the defendant's negligence was gross: 
In all actions brought to recover damages for injuries to a person or to his property 
caused by the negligence of another, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of 
contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery when the contributory negligence of the 
plaintiff was slight in comparison with the negligence of the defendant, but in such 
case, the damages shall be reduced in proportion to the amount of plaintifrs contribu-
tory negligence. 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1987). 
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is contributorily negligent but less than fifty percent at fault. This 
ranking is based on the accident described in the example. 
Lowest 
Contributory 
negligence 
Party A's Expected Net Recovery 
(0% < negligence level < 50%) 
Pure form 
comparative 
negligence 
Highest 
Modified forms 
of comparitive 
negligence 
To the extent the likelihood of involving an attorney in a dispute 
increases with the "stakes" (expected net recovery), the negligence stan-
dards can be ranked according to the incentives they create to retain 
counsel. The above ranking illustrates that the strongest incentives to 
retain counsel are associated with the modified forms of comparative 
negligence followed by the pure form. Contributory negligence should 
result in the weakest incentives to retain counsel. 
There are differences in incentives to litigate versus those to settle 
law suits. The settlement decision is a classic problem of decision-
making under uncertainty. The plaintiff demands a payment, P P' in 
exchange for the termination of the lawsuit. The defendant must then 
choose between the uncertain monetary liability associated with litiga-
tion and the certainty of payment in settlement. The decision must be 
made based on perceptions of the probability distribution43 of awards 
and the costs of continued litigation and settlement negotiation. The 
defendant selects a reservation price, Pd, which represents the maxi-
mum payment he is willing to make in exchange for termination of the 
litigation. If P P exceeds P d> the litigation continues. This simple deci-
sion rule is common to most models of the settlement process." 
Parties to a lawsuit may fail to agree on a settlement price for 
several reasons. First, there may be asymmetries in the information 
available to them so that one party is in a better position to assess the 
likelihood of winning; second, there may be differences in the risk pref-
43. Probability distribution is a statistical term that describes, in this case, the likelihood of 
obtaining an award level. The distribution will show a plaintiff the likelihood of recovering a 
certain amount. The probability may be empirical or based simply on retained counsel's settlement 
and litigation experience. 
44. The seminal paper is by Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & EcoN. 
61 (1971). Further refinements and extensions are made by Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement 
Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. EcoN. 404 (1984); I. P'ng, Strategic Behavior and 
Suit, Settlement and Trial, 14 BELL J. EcoN. 539 (1983); Reinganum and Wilde, Settlement, 
Litigation and the Allocation of Litigation Costs, 17 RAND J. EcoN. 557 (1986); Shavell, Suit, 
Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of 
Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982). 
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erences of the parties, such that the more risk-averse party is willing to 
make greater sacrifices than the less risk-averse party to avoid litiga-
tion; finally, even if the parties have access to the same information and 
are risk neutral, they may evaluate this information differently. A gen-
eral proposition arising from this simple litigation model is that the 
wider apart the parties' assessments of the outcome are, the more likely 
the case will be litigated. u 
It is possible to examine the litigation incentives created by negli-
gence rules, based on the analysis above, in terms of their impact on 
variances in expected awards. As Figure 1 depicts, claims in which the 
level of plaintiff negligence range from zero to less than fifty percent 
result in judgments which display more variability than judgments 
under the modified rules. Over this range, the expected net recovery 
schedule under the pure form displays more vertical dispersion. How-
ever, when the negligence level reaches fifty percent, the modified rules 
are associated with more variable outcomes. The figure illustrates that 
in disputes where plaintiff and defendant negligence levels are close to 
the fifty-fifty threshold, the variability in expected outcomes is consider-
ably higher in a modified rule jurisdiction. This implies that P d and P P 
are wider apart ex ante under the modified rule; therefore, settlement is 
less likely when negligence percentages are close to an even split. The 
hypothesis tested was that claims arising under the modified rule are 
more likely to be litigated to verdict than claims arising under the pure 
form, and this result is more likely when the parties' negligence per-
centages are closely situated. 
IV. THE EMPIRICAL EviDENCE 
As noted above, previous economic analysis of comparative negli-
gence has been primarily theoretical and focused on how alternative 
negligence standards affect incentives to exercise care when engaging in 
activities that can result in accidents.48 The early work (by Calabresi,47 
Posner,"8 Brown,"9 and Schwartz110) indicated that the use of the com-
45. See Bebchuk, supra note 44. Bebchuk presents an economic model of parties' litigation 
and settlement decisions under imperfect information. The model is used to identify how the likeli-
hood of the settlement is affected by various factors: the size of the stakes, the magnitude of litiga-
tion costs, and the nature of the parties' information. 
46. See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 15, at 1079-111 0; Haddock and Curran, supra note 15; 
Rea, supra note 15; Rubinfeld, The Efficiency of Comparative Negligence, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 
375 (1987). 
47. G. CALABRESI, supra note 15. 
48. R. PosNER, supra note 15. 
49. Brown, supra note 15. 
50. Schwartz, supra note 13. 
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parative negligence defense provides the "wrong" precaution incentives 
relative to traditional negligence rules. These early studies are based on 
models that assumed efficient precaution is unilateral (only one party 
can affect the likelihood of an accident).111 More recent work has fo-
cused on the possibility that an efficient comparative negligence stan-
dard can be designed.112 
The common thread in the literature on development of the opti-
mal liability rule focuses on incentives for caretaking. Scholars working 
in the area, however, invariably acknowledge the critical dependence of 
a rule's overall efficiency on associated litigation and administrative 
costs.113 Although recognized as critical, little evidence on the magnitude 
or impact of these costs has been forthcoming. Indeed, the possibility 
51. Brown's conclusions are based on a comparative caution model. Accident costs are allo-
cated according to the degree of efficiency any precautions taken by either party would have in 
preventing the accidents. Under Brown's model, which goes beyond the legal liability standard of 
ordinary care, both parties could be held liable in spite of meeting the standard of care. Cooter and 
Ulen refer to Brown's model as one of "comparative precaution" as opposed to comparative negli-
gence. Cooter & Ulen, supra note 15, at 1080. 
Calabresi notes that a comparative negligence standard requires both parties to take precau-
tions to prevent an accident when only one need do so. Further, the division of accident costs fails 
to provide both parties with adequate precaution incentives. G. CALABRESI, supra note 15, at 158. 
Posner's analysis is that comparative negligence gives incentives for parties to take precau-
tions when only one party needs to take action; as a result, comparative negligence is inefficient. 
Schwartz reaches the same conclusion as Posner and Brown. "The risk of treating basically equal 
litigants in a dramatically unequal manner is simply too great. Moreover, the break point creates 
a certain prospect of inefficient accident prevention." Schwartz, supra note 13, at 727. 
52. In his piece, as an alternative to the comparative standards, Schwartz suggested the de-
velopment of an optimal contributory negligence rule as follows: 
. . . (total prevention costs)-(party's prevention costs) 
Party's share of hab1hty = . 
total preventiOn costs 
Alternately, one could compare the net losses that the parties incurred by their 
failure to take preventive measures, that is, the differences between each party's preven-
tion costs and the expected value of the risk that each allowed to materialize. Thus, if 
the expected value of the risk is $100 and the respective prevention costs are . . . $40 
and $10, those differences are S60 and $90 respectively. The $40 party and $10 party 
would then bear liability in the ratio of 60/90. The liability of each party would be 
determined by the formula: 
Party's share of liability = 
2 X (expected value of risk)-(Total prevention costs) 
(expected value of risk)-(party's prevention costs) 
Schwartz, supra note 13, at 705-06 n.44. 
53. Cooter and Ulen also raise the issue of evidentiary uncertainties: 
In reality, the level of care that a "reasonable" person would take is a vague standard. 
Moreover, courts decide cases based upon the preponderance of evidence, which is sub-
stantially less than full information. For example, the court may have limited informa-
tion about the precautionary technology of the parties. Individuals, therefore, cannot 
predict with complete accuracy whether a court will conclude that a given level of 
precaution constitutes "due care". Instead, parties operate under conditions of eviden-
tiary uncertainty. 
Cooter & Ulen, supra note 15, at 1086 (footnote omitted). 
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exists that litigation costs may be of much greater social significance 
than differences in caretaking induced by alternative negligence rules. 
Newer theories suggest circumstances when comparative negligence 
may lead to a more optimal degree of precaution but fail to provide 
empirical evidence that any induced difference in caretaking impacts 
significantly on accident volume. This shortcoming in the literature is 
especially surprising, since the majority of jurisdictions have moved to-
ward some comparative negligence form. Apparently, they have done so 
with little understanding of how comparative negligence impacts litiga-
tion and associated litigation costs. Indeed, arguments have been made 
that adoption and application of comparative negligence results in more 
attorney involvement, more litigation,114 and higher verdict amounts.n 
However the only evidence provided to date is specific to one state's 
experience. 116 
The database used allowed a cross-state comparison of the alterna-
tive versions of pure and modified comparative negligence and contribu-
tory negligence. Results show that the type of negligence defense im-
pacts realized award amounts and accident victims' incentives to hire 
attorneys and file lawsuits and propensities to litigate rather than settle 
54. Posner has argued that even if incentives to exercise due care are efficient, comparative 
negligence is less desirable in that it adds a new dimension to the determination of fault and makes 
litigation more costly. R. PosNER, supra note 15 (3d ed. 1986). Posner also notes that comparative 
negligence may increase the probability of litigation, since use of the comparative standard makes 
it more difficult to predict outcomes. 
55. In Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981), the court discussed the issue of 
increased litigation: 
Opponents of the "pure" form of comparative negligence claim that the "modified" 
form is superior in that it will increase the likelihood of settlement and will keep down 
insurance costs. However, studies done comparing the effects of the "pure" versus the 
"modified" forms show the differences in insurance rates to be inconsequential. 
85 Ill. 2d at 26, 421 N.E.2d at 897 (citing ScHWARTZ, CoMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 346 (1974)). 
The Alvis court also noted: 
Fears as to the likelihood of settlement are not supported in fact or logic. It was argued 
that the negligent plaintiff will refuse to settle knowing that, under the "pure" system 
he will be able to recover "something" in court. The converse can as easily apply: the 
defendant may be encouraged to settle knowing that he cannot rely on the "modified" 
50% cut-off point to relieve him of liability. A comparison of results under both the 
"pure" and "modified" forms showed that in Arkansas there was only a slight decrease 
in number of settlements when the state changed from "pure" to "modified". 
/d. See Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After" Survey, 13 ARK. 
L. REV. 89 (1959)). 
56. The Arkansas study was one that examined subjective views of judges and lawyers before 
and after the passage of Arkansas' 19 55 comparative negligence statute. The study surveyed Ar-
kansas judges and attorneys regarding their perceptions of the statute's impact. Data on actual 
cases was limited to a survey of 98 lawyers and 19 judges. Size of verdicts, proportion of plaintiff 
victories, and number of settlements were all examined but based only on survey responses and not 
actual case reviews. The study suffers from a poor response rate as well as its second-hand data 
and perceptual input from respondents. 
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during the claim process. Figure 2 illustrates various factors reviewed 
by an injured claimant as he or she progresses from hiring an attorney 
to litigating. There are three general categories of factors expected to 
affect these decisions: (1) the characteristics of the individual and the 
accident causing the injury (e.g., degrees of fault of the parties to the 
accident); (2) the type of negligence defense available; and (3) other 
regulatory constraints such as the no-fault statutes, liability limitations, 
and/or caps on attorneys' fees. 67 
57. There are additional variables that can impact the decision-making of the claimants. For 
example, whether the jury is a blind jury (one that does not deal with the damage issue) or an 
informed jury (one that does deal with the damage issue) may affect the negotiation strength of the 
claimant. The following table summarizes the various states according to the role of their juries: 
ROLE OF JURY BY STATE AND NEGLIGENCE DEFENSE STANDARD* 
(as of 1977) 
STATE DEFENSE STANDARD BLIND JURY INFORMED JURY 
Arkansas 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Kansas 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
Minnesota 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
North Dakota 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
South Dakota 
Texas 
Utah 
Vermont 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
50% rule 
50% rule 
50% plus rule 
50% rule 
50'ro rule 
50% rule 
50% rule 
50% rule 
50% plus rule 
50% plus rule 
50'ro plus rule 
slight/ gross 
50% plus rule 
50% plus rule 
50% plus rule 
50% rule 
50% rule 
50% plus rule 
50% plus rule 
slight/gross 
50'ro plus rule 
50% rule 
50% plus rule 
50% plus rule 
50% rule 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
• Only comparative states are included since this is not an issue in contributory states. 
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The focus of this study is the impact of the negligence standard on 
the decisions illustrated in Figure 2. While other factors can affect 
these decisions, the highly aggregated nature of the data used in this 
study permits examination of statistical impact without explicitly con-
trolling individual claimant and injury attributes. The no-fault status of 
the relevant jurisdiction is controlled by including only claims arising in 
"fault" or tort states. Due to insufficient data on accidents involving 
fatalities and permanent total disabilities, this sample includes only 
non-fatal accidents and accidents producing less than permanent total 
disability. 
A. The Study Data Source 
The data were drawn from the Insurer Study of Auto Injury 
Closed Claims, which reports survey results from twenty-nine major 
U.S. insurance companies}58 The study reports information on all pri-
vate auto passenger insurance claims, arising in all areas of the coun-
try, which were "closed" with payment during a two-week period in 
1977. The survey time-frame is appropriate for our study, since the 
differential impact of negligence standards on attorney involvement and 
related litigation decisions and outcomes was examined.119 In 1977, 
states' use of liability standards varied (as noted in Table 1).80 The 
survey data were supplemented with information from state statutes 
and judicial decisions to determine the prevailing liability standard at 
the time the claim was closed and whether the state was classified as a 
58. The study was performed by the All-Industry Research Advisory Committee (AIRAC) 
and is entitled AUTOMOBILE INJURIES AND THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1979). 
59. To date, the data used is the only comprehensive study available and hence the only data 
that can be used. Future work can be done if another similar study is funded by insurers. 
60. The state groupings for purposes of computing the means under 1977 standards are 
listed in Table I. The following chart shows the method of adoption. Thirty-two states were using 
forms of comparative negligence and 18 states plus Washington, D.C. were using the contributory 
negligence standard. 
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comparative or contributory negligence state.81 In the analysis below, 
claims arising from bodily injury insurance coverage which arise in 
states classified as tort states (states without no-fault legislation) are 
examined. The sample includes data on 12,866 paid claims arising 
from injury-producing accidents.82 
DATES AND FORM OF MOVEMENT IN NEGLIGENCE DEFENSE STANDARDS* 
STATE 
Alaska 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Kansas 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New York 
North Dakota 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Dakota 
Texas 
Vermont 
Washington 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
*As of 1977 
STATUTE 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
DECISION 
X 
X 
DATE 
1975 
1955 
1975 
1973 
1973 
1973 
1955 
1969 
1971 
1974 
1965 
1969 
1969 
1919 
1975 
1913 
1973 
1969 
1973 
1975 
1973 
1973 
1971 
1976 
1971 
1941 
1973 
1870 
1873 
1931 
1973 
61. Again, the study used 1977 standards; the number of contributory negligence states is 
now less than half the number in the study. 
62. Fatalities and permanent total disabilities are not included in the data set because of their 
infrequent occurrence in the data and their nearly universal use of attorney representation in 
pursuing claims. Only observations with complete information on all variables in the model are 
included. 
56 
Comparative 
(Pure) 
Alaska 
California 
Florida 
Mississippi 
Rhode Island 
Washington 
B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW 
Table I 
LIABILITY STANDARDS 
(for purposes of 1977 Data) 
Comparative 
(Modified) 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Kansas 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
Minnesota 
Montana 
Nevada 
New Jersey 
New Hampshire 
North Dakota 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Texas 
Utah 
Vermont 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
Comparative 
(Slight/Gross) 
Nebraska 
South Dakota 
[Volume 5 
Contributory 
Alabama 
Arizona 
Delaware 
Washington DC 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maryland 
Michigan 
Missouri 
New Mexico 
North Carolina 
Ohio 
Puerto Rico 
South Carolina 
Tennessee 
Virginia 
West Virginia 
Several limitations should be borne in mind when assessing any 
policy proposals based on the empirical results. First, the data are only 
for "fault" or tort states. Second, the most serious, i.e., fatal accidents 
are excluded. Third, the data are limited to claims that were closed 
with payment. Data are not available on those claims that were closed 
without payment. This attribute of the data is not as significant as may 
initially appear since, for claimants who are not negligent at all, the 
liability standard should not impact on incentives to hire an attorney or 
to file or litigate a law suit, nor should the standard impact on award 
amount. Theoretically, a non-negligent claimant will be treated in the 
same manner by all negligence rules considered here (refer to Figure 1 
at zero percent negligence). For claimants who are partially at fault 
(provided fault is less than the bench mark in the modified form juris-
dictions), such negligence ostensibly would bar recovery of plaintiffs 
only in contributory negligence states. It is possible that claims arising 
in contributory negligence states, which result in no recovery, are de-
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leted from the sample. Therefore, if the data contain a selection bias, it 
is a bias against finding a statistically significant difference in claim 
outcomes between contributory and comparative negligence states. As 
shown below, such differences exist in spite of this possible bias. 
Fourth, the focus in this study is to provide evidence regarding the 
differential in social costs of dispute resolution. The analysis is limited 
to measurement of observable behavior in terms of claimants' decisions 
and the outcomes of those decisions. Outcome is measured by two vari-
ables: realized award and payment timing.63 There may well be differ-
ences in claimants' incentives to take precaution that are induced by a 
particular liability rule as is suggested by previously cited theoretical 
literature. It is reasonable to expect that precautionary behavior is a 
determinant of the extent of accidents that do occur. However, without 
corresponding time series data on accident volume, it is not possible to 
determine the total empirical impact of the comparative negligence 
standard. Future empirical work is needed to assess the importance of 
the caretaking issue. To the extent it is believed the accident volume is 
not significantly affected by negligence standards, the state's decision as 
to which particular standard to adopt appears to rest primarily with 
associated litigation and administration cost differentials addressed 
here. 
B. The Degree of Claimant Negligence 
The first column of Table II shows data on the reported level of 
claimant negligence for the sample of accident victims. The negligence 
levels are those reported by the insurance companies responding to the 
survey. The mean level of claimant negligence is shown for the four 
categories of negligence rules adopted by the states. It is expected that 
the claimant's negligence will be evaluated by the plaintiff in determin-
ing whether or not to hire an attorney and/or settle or litigate a claim. 
For example, under strict contributory negligence, any amount of 
claimant negligence bars recovery. Claimant negligence in this situation 
is a more negative factor from the claimant's perspective in award ne-
gotiations than it would be under a comparative negligence standard. It 
should follow then, other things remaining the same, that a negligent 
claimant will be less successful in securing a settlement payment under 
a contributory negligence standard than under a comparative negligence 
standard. Since claimants represented in the data are "successful" in 
63. The variable of timing was chosen because time expended on claim processing is an 
administrative cost. The level of award variable is the thrust of the study hypothesis-that actual 
costs (i.e., awards) vary according to the types of negligence defenses. 
Type of State 
(Nogl fgence Rule) 
(1) 
Percentage Clai--.t 
Negligence• 
Table II 
STATE CQ!PARISOII STATISTICS OF ACCIDENT 
CLAIM DISPOSITION 
(2) 
Percentage of 
~~-:s• who Retained 
(3) 
Realized AWIIrd 
Award Alooult0 
(4) 
No. of Doys Fr .. 
Accfden~ to Firat 
Pe_.,t 
(5) 
No. of 
Ob&ervat ions 
Contributory 
Negligence 
! 4.02X I 37.2X I $1747.3 I 223.6 : 6,813 I 
(14.37) ' (48.3) ' (11370.6) ' (363.5) 
Sl i ght/Grooo 
C~rative 
Neg! i genc:e 
Pure Fora 
COIIIpBrat i ve 
Negl igenc:e 
Modified 
CC~~~P~~rative 
Negl igenc:e 
All States 
4.42X 
(15.12) 
7.27X 
(18.97) 
8.73X 
(19.09) 
5.7DX 
(16.78) 
29.5X 
(49.5) 
48.6X 
(50.0) 
45.6X 
(49.8) 
42.1X 
(49.4) 
$1802.2 
(3397.7) 
S2014.7 
(5296.7) 
$2090.9 
(4989.7) 
$1880.4 
(9012.2> 
201.7 
(323.7) 
303.2 
(480.0) 
398.0 
(603.7) 
271.1 
(442.7) 
78 
4,530 
1,445 
12,866 
Notes··Stnfstics in col~ (1)·(4) are liNn statistics followed by the stMdard deviation in parentheses. The state groupings for pur-poses of 
COIIpJting the statistics are listed in Table 1. 
The statistical significance of differences in Means for the various negligence defenses was eval..-ted by COIIPIJtfng a z statistic defh-,ed as 
z = cx1 • x2> Js~tN 1 • s~tN2 
wfJkh ass...es i~t variables drawn fr011 non~Bl populations. Critical values for the standard no~l statistics are: zc _9 = t 1.645; 
z .95 = • 1.96; z .99 = • 2.56. 
1All pairwise c~risons of ~~tan percentage clahant negligence across netligence rules produce Z statistics that are signiHcant at the .95 level or 
.99 level with the exceptions of: the contributory negligence and slight/gross C0ft1P8rison and the slight/gross and pure fon1 of c~rative 
~~ igence c""""rison (Z = ·1.64). 
All pairwise cot~p~~dsons of 1111ean percentage of claimants who retain COU"'Sel proc:U:e Z statistics that are significant at the .95 level or .99 level 
with the exception of the contdbutory negligence and slight/gross c~rison. 
cAward levels are significantly different fr011 each other when c~ring contributory and pure form (Z z -1.69) and contributory and modified 
CZ = -1.81>. These dUferences are significant at the .90 level. The award 8IICU'Its were reduced by 35.5 percent in cases where an attorney was 
r.etained by the claimant. 0All pairwise CCJq)lrisons of .nean days to payment prociJce Z statistics that are significant at the .99 level with the exception of the contributory 
negligence and slight/gross conperison. 
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The results are consistent with this hypothesis as shown in column 
(1). The lowest level of negligence reported is for the contributory neg-
ligence standard (4.02%), followed by the slight-gross standard (4.42%), 
and pure comparative negligence standard (7.27%), and, finally, modi-
fied comparative negligence standard (8.73%). Except for comparisons 
involving the slight-gross rule, these differences are statistically signifi-
cant (each from the other) at a ninety-five percent level of confidence or 
better. 
As discussed above, these findings do not necessarily indicate that 
caretaking is at a lower level in modified states, but rather may indicate 
that higher expected awards for negligent claimants attract, on average, 
more negligent claimants. 
C. Differences in Claimants' Incentives to Retain Counsel 
Consistent with empirical predictions presented in section III, a 
recent study by Low and Smith indicates that under a comparative neg-
ligence standard, in contrast to contributory negligence, there is a 
higher probability that a claimant will retain an attorney.84 The study 
further finds that there will be higher award levels for those contribu-
torily negligent claimants who do retain counsel. Table II supports 
these findings and offers further refinement by examining retention in-
centives across the three types of comparative negligence standards as 
well. 
An accident victim rationally will choose to hire an attorney if the 
expected benefit (a higher expected monetary award) exceeds the ex-
pected cost (attorney fees). As the analysis in section III shows, the 
expected net award is higher, given a similar accident, under compara-
tive versus contributory negligence. Hence, it is more likely a claimant 
will involve an attorney under the modified, pure, and slight-gross stan-
dards than under the contributory negligence standard. The percent-
ages in column (2) of Table II generally are consistent with this expec-
tation as indicated by statistical comparisons of pairwise comparisons in 
64. SeeS. Low & J. Smith, The Effect of Alternative Negligence Rules of Attorney Involve-
ment in Accident Disputes (1989) (unpublished manuscript). Here the authors conclude: 
In both types of states the driver's (potential defendant's) degree of negligence has a 
significantly negative impact on the likelihood of representation. In contributory negli-
gence states the rate of change in likelihood of representation is more than that in 
comparative negligence states. . . . As claimant degree of negligence rises from 1 0"/o to 
30% to 50% in contributory negligence states (driver negligence falls from 90% to 70% 
to 50%) the probability of representation rises from 50% to 55% to 60%, respectively. 
The comparable values for an individual in a comparative negligence state are 59%, 
63%, and 67%. 
/d. at 16. 
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retention percentages. While it cannot be determined whether the level 
of litigation rises as a result of adopting comparative negligence, the 
evidence strongly indicates attorneys are more likely to be involved in 
the claims process. 
D. Award Amounts: Differences Across Liability Standards 
The numerical example presented above on expected recovery, 
under various defenses, demonstrates that for an identical accident, the 
expected net award under the most popular form of comparative negli-
gence (modified versions 1 and 2) is higher than the award associated 
with the pure form. All forms of the comparative negligence standard 
yield higher expected net awards than under a contributory negligence 
standard. As shown in Figure 1, this proposition holds as long as a 
claimant is less than fifty percent at fault. The data are consistent with 
the economic principle that plaintiffs and defendants act as rational de-
cision-makers by factoring in the relevant liability standards when ne-
gotiating claims. Column (3) of Table II provides a summary of the 
award amounts (mean figures) classified according to the state negli-
gence standards. In cases where the claimant was represented by coun-
sel, these award amounts were reduced to reflect attorneys fees, esti-
mated at 35.5%.611 
Column (3) further demonstrates that the resulting mean award to 
a representative claimant is highest for the modified states, where the 
mean award is $2,091; followed by the pure form ($2,015) and the 
slight-gross form ($1 ,802).66 The lowest mean award figure is associ-
ated with the contributory standard of $1,747. The award level differ-
ence between contributory negligence and pure comparative negligence 
and between contributory and modified are significant at the . 90 level 
of confidence. 
The dollar difference, in award levels between the pure form and 
the modified form, is in the expected direction ($76 higher recovery in 
modified comparative negligence states), but the difference is not statis-
tically significant. However, there is evidence that the award differen-
tial between the modified and pure form does increase (as suggested by 
Figure 1) as the negligence level approaches fifty percent. For example, 
if claims are selected that are comparable in terms of attorneys being 
involved and the claims being disposed of before filing suit, awards on 
65. The 35.5'l'o figure is the one used by AIRAC in their study, supra note 58. 
66. It is also of interest to note that the average award amount in modified standard states is 
significantly higher than the universal average award. Although the category of slight/gross is 
included, the small size of the sample (attributable to its limited adoption) may preclude any 
meaningful observations. 
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average are higher by $732 when in the 0-20% range; the differential 
rises in the 21-40% range to $2,250. 
E. Differences in Claim Delay: The Number of Days from Accident to 
Payment 
It appears that not only are the monetary costs to dispose of claims 
under comparative negligence standards higher, there are also signifi-
cantly more delays (time costs) associated with claim disposition. Col-
umn ( 4) of Table II indicates that delay in securing claim payment is 
significantly higher under the modified and pure forms than under the 
contributory negligence standard-on average 80 to 17 4 additional days 
for payment. Delay can be considered a social cost associated with a 
liability standard, although it is not possible to determine whether the 
causality runs from the liability standard to delay directly or whether 
the comparative negligence claims take longer to negotiate because at-
torneys are more likely to be involved. The results may be driven by a 
difference in the injuries involved, but there is no direct evidence of any 
systematic difference across the states in terms of severity of the injuries 
suffered by claimants. 
F. The Impact of Attorney Involvement 
More details concerning relationships between attorney involve-
ment and award amount, negligence levels, and delays resulting from 
the liability standard are presented in Table III. The table shows dif-
ferences between claims that are and are not associated with attorney 
involvement. Since it can be presumed that a more negligent claimant 
has a more difficult case to make, it is not surprising, as indicated in 
column (2), that claimants who are represented have higher mean neg-
ligence levels than claimants who negotiate their own claims. This re-
sult holds across all liability standards: negligence levels are consistently 
higher for those claims associated with attorney involvement. 
(1) 
Type of State 
(Negligence Rule) 
Contributory 
Negligence 
Pure Form 
COII'f)8rative 
Negligence 
Modified 
COII'f)8rative 
Negligence 
Table III 
CLAIM DISPOSITION AND ATTORNEY INVOLVEMENT: 
(2) 
Percent Claimant 
Negligence 
Attorneyb No Attorneyc 
STATE COMPARISON STATISTICS 
(3) 
Realized Awarcfl 
Attorne~ No Attorneyc 
(Net of fees) 
(4) 
No. of Days from 
Accident to first Paymenta 
~b No Attorneyc 
(5) 
No. of Observations 
Attorney No Attorney 
I ------s:-66%- • --3-.o4Xj $2957.5 ___ .. S1031. 1 I 463.5 - 81.5 I 2533n • 4280J 
I <16.64> <12.73> 1 <9461.5> 12307.5> 1 <474.6> <151.2> 1 I 
I I I I I 
I I I I I I 9.15% 5.49XI S3168.8 S923.1 I 532.3 86.6 I 2202 2328l 
I <21.01> <16.63>l <7096.8> <2124.4> 1 <591.7> <143.6> 1 I 
I I I I I 
I I I I I 
I I I I I I 8.99% 8.51XI S3457.6 s945.o I 751.8 101.3 I 659 786 1 I <19.04> <19.14> 1 <6551.6> <2634.9> 1 <732.1> <166.9> 1 I 
I I I I I 
I I I I I 
Notes··Statistics in columns (1)·(4) are mean statistics followed by the standard deviation in parentheses. The state groupings for purposes of 
computing the statistics are listed in Table 1. The slight/gross grouping is excluded from this Table due to lack of sufficient data to make 
statistical COII'f)8risons. Critical values for the standard normal statistics are as indicated in notes to Table II. 
&with one exception, all pairwise comparisons across the three types of states produce Z statistics that are significant at the .99 level when 
comparing the results for those claimants who involved an attorney and those who did not involve an attorney in terms of difference in: percent 
claimant negligence, award amount and payment delay. The exception is that there is no statistically significant difference in percent claimant 
~gl igence for represented and unrepresented claimants in modified ~Ofl1)8rative negligence states. 
For those claims involving attorneys: all pairwise comparisons of percent claimant negligence are significant at the .99 level except for the pure 
and modified comparison; the award level differences are not statistically significant; all pairwise comparisons of payment delay are significant at 
the .99 level. 
cFor those claims aQ! involving attorneys: all pairwise comparisons in claimant negligence are significant at the .99 level; the award level 
differences are not statistically significant; all comparisons in payment delay are significant except for the contributory negligence-pure form 
c0fl1)8r i son. 
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Column (3) shows that attorneys generally are utilized when the 
"stakes" associated with the claim (as measured by realized award 
amount) are higher. The differences in award amounts between claims 
negotiated with an attorney and those negotiated without are statisti-
cally significant across all liability standards. The higher standard 
deviation (noted also in Table II) in award amount, in contributory 
negligence states, is associated with claims involving attorneys as well 
as claims not involving attorneys. For comparative negligence states, it 
appears that attorney involvement is associated with a higher variance 
of award levels, in contrast to contributory negligence states where the 
variance is relatively lower for represented as opposed to unrepresented 
claimants. 
It is clear that regardless of the liability standard, attorney involve-
ment is associated with a significantly longer delay between date of in-
jury and date of initial payment as shown in column (4). All differences 
in column ( 4) are statistically significant. The claims negotiated under 
modified cGmparative negligence are associated with significantly longer 
delays than either the pure or the contributory negligence rule. 
G. The Incentive to Litigate Versus Settle Under the Various Negli-
gence Standards 
As shown in the decision tree diagram in Figure 2, there is a series 
of sequential decisions that claimants make in the process of resolving a 
claim (i.e., securing a payment). Results of the decision process for 
claims arising under the three primary liability standards appear in 
Figure 3. Since it was previously shown that claimants are more likely 
to involve attorneys if comparative negligence is the prevailing stan-
dard, it is not surprising to find that the probability of an attorney 
filing a suit is significantly higher under pure and modified compara-
tive negligence than under contributory negligence. Only 37o/o of the 
claimants in contributory negligence states that involved attorneys filed 
suit, compared to 48.7% and 46.4% under pure and modified standards, 
respectively. 
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Figure 3 
Claim Disposition By Negligence Standard 
Contributory Suit 
Negligence: Filed 
Attny P=37.3% 
z( Rep. Litigation P=37.2"!o P=7.4% N=6813 No Suit Accident No Attny Filed Settlement Claims Rep. P=62.7"!o P=92.6"!o 
P=62.8"!o 
Suit 
Pure Form Attny Filed 
Comparative Rep. P=48.7% Negligence: P=48.6"!o Litigation 
P=6.7% 
N=4530 
Accident No Suit 
Claims No Attny Filed 
Rep. P=51.3"!o Settlement 
P=51.4"!o P=93.3% 
Modified Suit 
Contributory Attny Filed 
Negligence: Rep. P=46.4% 
P=45.6"!o Litigation 
P=lS.O"!o 
N=1445 
Accident 
Claims 
No Attny No Suit 
Rep. Filed Settlement 
P=54.4"!o P=53.6"!o P=SS.O"!o 
Notes: N=Number of claims arising in the decision category, P=Percentage of claims arising in 
the decision category. 
The decision to retain: all differences in probabilities across standards are significant at the .95 
!eye! or higher. 
The decision to file: all differences in probabilities are significant at the . 99 level with the excep-
tion of the prue-modified comparison. 
The decision to litigate: all differences in probabilities are significant at the . 99 level with the 
exception of the contributory pure comparison. 
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Results in Figure 3 also illustrate a difference across comparative 
negligence standards in the percentage of suits filed that resulted in 
litigation. Although very few cases ever result in litigation, the percent-
age of suits filed that are litigated is 15% under the modified standard 
as opposed to only 7.4% and 6.9% under the contributory and pure 
comparative forms of negligence defenses, respectively. These percent-
ages of litigated suits are statistically different from one another at a 
. 99 level of confidence. The higher litigation probability for the modi-
fied form is disturbing because of the modified form's added social cost. 
To gain a better understanding of the apparently stronger incen-
tive to litigate under the modified rule, decisions to litigate versus deci-
sions to settle were examined as a function of negligence level. The 
finding was that as the claimant's negligence level increases, a lower 
percentage of cases are litigated under both pure and modified stan-
dards. However, claimants demonstrate a significantly increased pro-
pensity to litigate in the twenty-one to fifty percent negligence range 
under modified versus pure form comparative negligence. The data 
here is limited and significance could not be determined. However, 
these figures are consistent with the proposition that modified compara-
tive negligence is associated with higher litigation and administrative 
costs than pure comparative negligence. 
V. SuMMARY oF FINDINGS AND PoucY CoNCERNS 
The dramatic shift in basic tort law from negligence with a de-
fense of contributory negligence to comparative negligence has sparked 
considerable literature on the motivation and efficiency of the policy 
changes. Surprisingly, these changes were enacted with little analysis of 
the likely impact on litigation behavior or the social costs that arise in 
the form of increased litigation, recovery amounts, and delay in secur-
ing payment. The evidence provided in this article indicates that com-
parative negligence is accompanied by distinctly different incentives af-
fecting key litigation decisions of accident victims. Furthermore, there 
are striking differences in the resolution processes which are associated 
with differences in the major forms of comparative negligence. In par-
ticular, the popular modified forms appear to be associated with signifi-
cantly higher costs than the pure form in terms of increased likelihood 
of attorney involvement, higher recovery at higher levels of claimant 
negligence, more time delay, and greater incentives to litigate rather 
than settle lawsuits. 
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A. Award Levels, Negligence Levels, and Delays in Payment 
On average, claimants receiving payment for injuries in pure and 
modified comparative negligence states are approximately twice as neg-
ligent as claimants receiving payment in contributory negligence states. 
In spite of this, when compared to other negligence rules, the modified 
form of comparative negligence results in higher dollar award amounts 
and longer payment delays. The modified (pure) form is associated, on 
average, with $376 ($267) more per claim and 174 (79) additional days 
of delay in securing payment than claims resolved in a state using the 
contributory negligence defense. Generally, in contrast to contributory 
negligence, either form of comparative negligence results in higher costs 
due to higher award levels and delay in securing payment. 
B. Attorney Involvement 
On average, the probability of involving an attorney in claim reso-
lution is statistically higher in comparative negligence settings. In pure 
form comparative negligence states, the mean percentage of claimants 
selecting representation is 48.6o/o, compared to 45.6o/o in modified states 
and 37.2o/o in contributory negligence states. 
C. Suit Filings, Litigation, and Settlement 
In all negligence rule settings, attorney involvement is associated 
with higher awards and longer payment delays. Only 37o/o of accident 
claims involving attorneys in contributory negligence states result in a 
suit being filed, compared to 48.7o/o and 46.6o/o, respectively, in pure 
and modified states. This finding indicates that the administrative costs 
under a comparative negligence standard are substantial. The number 
of automobile tort suits that are litigated versus the number that are 
settled is very low, regardless of the applicable liability standard. Nev-
ertheless, the results indicate that the modified form of comparative 
negligence is associated with significantly more litigation than either 
the .pure form or contributory negligence. In states adopting the modi-
fied form, fifteen percent of all lawsuits resulted in litigation compared 
to approximately seven percent in states adopting alternative negligence 
standards. 
D. Policy Issues 
These findings raise significant policy concerns, particularly for 
states adopting the modified form of comparative negligence. While 
contributory negligence as a defense has been abandoned and compara-
tive negligence has been adopted for what may best be described as 
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"equity" reasons, it is difficult to identify any compelling equity advan-
tages in the modified form relative to the pure form of comparative 
negligence. Furthermore, the results here indicate that even if such eq-
uity advantages exist, they must be compelling, in the form of greater 
incentives to litigate versus settle and significantly longer delays in se-
curing payment, to justify the higher costs of dispute resolution under 
modified standards. 
As previously noted, efficiency had little to do with the shift to 
comparative negligence and the same may be true as to factors affecting 
which form of comparative negligence states selected. The choice may 
indeed reflect, as others have suggested, changing opportunities for in-
terest groups, such as lawyers or their clients or insurance companies.67 
The results of this study indicate that attorneys "do better" under com-
parative negligence: the probability of attorney involvement is higher, 
recovery amounts are higher, and attorneys' fees based on paid claims 
are higher when calculated on a percentage basis. 
An implicit assumption of previous analysis of tort liability rules is 
that litigation behavior and resulting administrative costs do not vary 
across liability rules. With that assumption now shown to be an incor-
rect one, efficiency analysis must be revisited and the endorsement of 
any one form of comparative negligence as the "best" rule must be 
reexamined. 
67. R. Curran, supra note 12, at 24. "Because so many of the states adopting the pure form 
of comparative negligence did so through court decisions, one cannot help but suspect there is a 
relationship between the method of adoption and the form of the rule adopted." /d. 
Clearly, additional analysis is needed to ascertain the nature of such a relationship. 
